No. 17-965

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

STATE OF HAWAII, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, AND INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

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QUESTION PRESENTED

This brief addresses only question 4 in the government's brief: "Whether the global injunction is impermissibly overbroad."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2
ARGUMENT 3
District courts have the authority to provide injunctive relief that benefits non-parties as well as the plaintiff. 3
A. A district court's remedial authority is not limited by geography. 3
B. Injunctions routinely benefit non-parties. 5
C. Many of this Court's cases have involved injunctions that benefitted non-parties. 7
D. The courts of appeals have unanimously held that injunctions may benefit non-parties. 10
E. Neither constitutional nor equitable principles require the benefit of injunctions to be confined to plaintiffs. 16
F. The APA presumes that courts may issue injunctions that benefit non-parties. 18
G. Some of the government's arguments against these injunctions bear on their appropriateness in any particular case, not on the court's authority to issue them. 20
H. These injunctions are especially important where federalism is at stake. 22
CONCLUSION 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 8
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) 8
Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1988) 14, 15
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) 8
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) 21
City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012) 24
City of Berkeley v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2015 WL 1737523 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 24
City of Oakland v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2015) 24
City of Spokane v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 775 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2014) 24
County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 24
Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1981) 14
Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), *aff'd*, 474 U.S. 361 (1986) 15
Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F. 3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds*, 555 U.S. 488 (2009) 14, 20
Evans v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1982) 12
Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973) 11

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) 18
Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 20
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) 7
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) 9
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) 16
Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) 19
Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. 148 (1810) 4
Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981) 13
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) 21
Montgomery Cty. v. FCC, 811 F.3d 121 (4th Cir. 2015) 24
National Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs., 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 15
New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) 4
New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.M. 1975) 9
New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959) 4
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 8
Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994) 8
Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d 1300 (4th Cir. 1992) 11, 12
Sable Commc'ns. of Calif., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) 8
Sable Commc'ns. of Calif., Inc. v. FCC, 692 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1988) 8
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841 (1984) 9

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) 14
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) 4
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), *aff'd by an equally divided Court*, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) 12, 13, 21
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) 16
Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) 9, 10
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) 20
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 8
Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001) 12
Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) 10, 11
Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) 8, 9
Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994) 13, 14

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 21

STATUTE

5 U.S.C. § 706(2) 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Law Institute, *Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation* (2010) 6, 7

William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1768) 17
Philip Hamburger, *Law and Judicial Duty* (2008) 18
Steve Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (2011) 18
Bernard Schwartz, *Forms of Review Action in English Administrative Law*, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 203 (1956) 18
U.S. Census Bureau, *2012 Census of Governments* 23
U.S. Census Bureau, *Government Organization Summary Report: 2012* 23
Charles Alan Wright et al., *Federal Practice & Procedure* (3d ed. Westlaw) 6

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE[1]

The National League of Cities is the oldest and largest organization representing municipal governments throughout the United States. Its mission is to strengthen and promote cities as centers of opportunity, leadership, and governance. Working in partnership with 49 State municipal leagues, NLC serves as a national advocate for the more than 19,000 cities, villages, and towns it represents.

The International City/County Management Association is a nonprofit professional and educational organization of over 9,000 appointed chief executives and assistants serving cities, counties, towns, and regional entities. ICMA's mission is to create excellence in local governance by advocating and developing the professional management of local governments throughout the world.

The International Municipal Lawyers Association has been an advocate and resource for local government attorneys since 1935. Owned solely by its more than 3,000 members, IMLA serves as an international clearinghouse for legal information and cooperation on municipal legal matters.

Respondents speak for local governments, most of which are very small and lack the resources to sue the United States when it oversteps the bounds of

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[1] No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amici made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Petitioners have filed a blanket consent to amicus briefs. Respondents have consented to the filing of this brief.

federalism. They rely on a handful of big cities to obtain injunctions barring federal encroachment. The novel and deeply mistaken view of federal courts' remedial power advanced in section IV of the United States' brief would cause great harm to local governments throughout the country.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Where a factory unlawfully pollutes the air, may a district court enjoin the pollution? Or must the court's injunction be limited to only those particles of pollution that affect the plaintiff personally?

Where a state operates unlawfully segregated schools, may a district court require the schools to be integrated? Or is the court limited to ordering the schools to admit only the individual students named as plaintiffs?

Where the federal government exceeds its constitutional authority, may a district court order the government to stop? Or is the court constrained to order the government to stop only with respect to the plaintiffs, so that every state, city, and individual affected by the federal government's overreach must bring its own separate lawsuit and obtain its own separate injunction?

The conventional answer to each of these questions is, of course, that federal courts have the authority to provide injunctive relief that benefits nonparties as well as the plaintiff. Provided that the plaintiff has standing, the court may require the defendant to cease its unlawful activity, even if the plaintiff will not be the only one who benefits. The court certainly need not do so in every case—

injunctions often benefit the plaintiff and no one else—but in an appropriate case, the court has the authority to issue an injunction that benefits non-parties in addition to the plaintiff.

In a few pages at the very end of its brief (U.S. Br. 72-76), the government proposes an astonishing contraction of the remedial power of the federal courts. According to the government's novel theory, an injunction may "redress a plaintiff's own cognizable injuries" (U.S. Br. 72) but not the injuries of anyone else.

The government is mistaken. District courts have the authority to provide injunctive relief that benefits non-parties as well as the plaintiff. These injunctions are extremely common. In fact, they have figured in many of this Court's cases. This is why the courts of appeals have unanimously held that injunctions may benefit non-parties. Contrary to the government's view, neither constitutional nor equitable principles require the benefit of injunctions to be confined to plaintiffs. Some of the government's arguments against these injunctions, in any event, bear on their appropriateness in any given case, not on the court's authority to issue them.

ARGUMENT

District courts have the authority to provide injunctive relief that benefits non-parties as well as the plaintiff.

A. A district court's remedial authority is not limited by geography.

The government repeatedly uses the term "global" to disparage the injunctions it dislikes (U.S. Br. 72,

75), but that is a misnomer. It has long been accepted—and the government does not dispute—that a court's remedial authority is not confined to the boundaries of its judicial district, or its circuit, or even the United States. "[T]he District Court in exercising its equity powers may command persons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside its territorial jurisdiction." *Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc.*, 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952). This was a basic principle of equity in England and one this Court adopted more than two centuries ago. *Massie v. Watts*, 10 U.S. 148, 160 (1810) ("the jurisdiction of a court of chancery is sustainable wherever the person be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree") (citing English precedent). *See also New York v. O'Neill*, 359 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1959) (where a court has "personal jurisdiction over respondent by virtue of his presence within that State," the court may order respondent to undertake actions to be "carried on in a foreign jurisdiction"); *New Jersey v. City of New York*, 283 U.S. 473, 482 (1931) (where the defendant is before the court, the court may enjoin the defendant's conduct "whether within or without the United States").

The rule could hardly be otherwise. If the remedial authority of a district court were confined to its judicial district, an injunction would be of little value, because the defendant could simply continue its unlawful conduct in a different district. To stop the infringement of a patent, for example, the plaintiff would have to file a separate lawsuit and obtain a new injunction in every district where the defendant might persist in his infringement. That has never been the law.

Despite the government's use of the term "global" to disparage the injunction in this case, therefore, the government's objection to the injunction is not to its geographic scope. Rather, the government's beef is that the injunction benefits non-parties as well as parties. But this objection is groundless, because injunctions routinely benefit non-parties, and they have done so for a very long time.

B. Injunctions routinely benefit non-parties.

Injunctions often benefit non-parties as well as the plaintiff. This is so common that we often don't even notice it.

For example:

• When a court finds that a religious display violates the Establishment Clause, the court often orders the display to be taken down. The court does not redress only the plaintiff's injury—for instance, by ordering the display to be covered up whenever the plaintiff is within viewing distance. Rather, the court simply forbids the unlawful display, in a way that benefits everyone offended by the display, not just the plaintiff.

• When a court finds that the drawing of electoral districts violates the Equal Protection Clause or the Voting Rights Act, the court often orders the districts to be redrawn in a lawful manner. The court does not redress only the plaintiff's injury—for instance, by boosting the power of the plaintiff's own vote but no one else's. Rather, the court simply forbids use of the unlawful districts, in a way that benefits everyone whose vote is affected, not just the plaintiff.

• When a court finds that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment, the court often orders the prison to correct those conditions. The court does not redress only the plaintiff's injury—for instance, by requiring that the plaintiff, but no other prisoner, be given minimally adequate food and shelter. Rather, the court simply prohibits the unlawful prison conditions, in a way that benefits all prisoners, not just the plaintiff.

We could fill this brief with hundreds of similar examples, but the point should already be clear. Injunctions—especially injunctions against the government—routinely benefit everyone affected by the government's conduct. In such cases, relief is not limited to the plaintiff. As the Wright & Miller treatise explains,

> In most civil-rights cases plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief that will halt a discriminatory employment practice or that will strike down a statute, rule, or ordinance on the ground that it is constitutionally offensive. Whether plaintiff proceeds as an individual or on a class-suit basis, the requested relief generally will benefit not only the claimant but all other persons subject to the practice or the rule under attack.

7A Charles Alan Wright et al., *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 1771 (3d ed. Westlaw).

In its *Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation*, the American Law Institute recognizes the same truth:

> When a claimant seeks a prohibitory injunction or a declaratory judgment with respect to a

> generally applicable policy or practice maintained by a defendant, those remedies—if afforded—generally stand to benefit or otherwise affect all persons subject to the disputed policy or practice, even if relief is nominally granted only as to the named claimant. Even in litigation against governmental entities, to which limitations on preclusion may apply as a formal matter, the generally applicable nature of the policy or practice typically means that the defendant government will be in a position, as a practical matter, either to maintain or to discontinue the disputed policy or practice as a whole, not to afford relief therefrom only to the named claimant.

American Law Institute, *Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation* § 2.04 comment a (2010).

The government thus errs in asserting that there is something "troubling" (U.S. Br. 72) or "misguided" (U.S. Br. 76) about injunctions that benefit people other than the plaintiff. Injunctions routinely do that.

C. Many of this Court's cases have involved injunctions that benefitted non-parties.

Injunctions that benefit non-parties have figured in many of this Court's cases. Such injunctions are so commonplace that the governmental defendants in these cases did not even argue in this Court that the lower court had exceeded its authority by extending the benefit of the injunction to non-parties.

For example:

• In *Hollingsworth v. Perry*, 570 U.S. 693, 702 (2013), the district court enjoined California officials

from enforcing a state law barring gay marriage—not just against the plaintiffs but against everyone.

• In *Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n*, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011), the district court enjoined the enforcement of a state law imposing restrictions on violent video games—not just against the plaintiffs but against everyone. (For the text of the injunction, see *Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger*, 2007 WL 2261546, *12 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).

• In *Ashcroft v. ACLU*, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004), the district court enjoined the Attorney General from enforcing a statute restricting explicit materials on the Internet—not just against the plaintiffs but against everyone. (For the text of the injunction, see *ACLU v. Reno*, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 498-99 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).

• In *Printz v. United States*, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997), the district court enjoined the United States from enforcing a statute requiring state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks of prospective handgun purchasers—not just against the plaintiff but against everyone. (For the text of the injunction, see *Printz v. United States*, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519-20 (D. Mont. 1994)).

• In *Sable Commc'ns. of Calif., Inc. v. FCC*, 492 U.S. 115, 119 (1989), the district court enjoined the FCC from enforcing a statute banning indecent telephone messages—not just against the plaintiff but against everyone. (For the text of the injunction, see *Sable Commc'ns. of Calif., Inc. v. FCC*, 692 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1988)).

• In *Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors*, 473 U.S. 305, 316 (1985), the district court enjoined

the Veterans Administration from enforcing a statute limiting attorneys' fees in proceedings before the VA—not just against the plaintiffs but against everyone. *See also id.* at 336 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing the district court's order as "a nationwide injunction").

• In *Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp.*, 468 U.S. 841, 846 (1984), the district court entered a "nationwide injunction" barring the federal government from enforcing a statute denying education funds to students who failed to register for the draft—not just against the plaintiffs but against everyone.

• In *Kleppe v. New Mexico*, 426 U.S. 529, 534 (1976), the district court enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act—not just against the plaintiffs but against everyone. (For the text of the injunction, see *New Mexico v. Morton*, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (D.N.M. 1975)).

This is just a partial list. We could have provided many more examples.

One additional example deserves special mention. When an earlier installment of the instant litigation reached the Court last Term, the Court refused the government's request to stay an injunction "that covered not just respondents, but parties similarly situated to them—that is, people or entities in the United States who have relationships with foreign nationals abroad." *Trump v. IRAP*, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017). The Court was evidently unpersuaded by the government's argument that a so-called "global injunction" was overbroad because non-

parties could benefit from it. *See* Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 31-33, *Trump v. IRAP*, No. 16-1436 (June 1, 2017); Application for Stay 38-40, *Trump v. IRAP*, No. 16-A-1190 (June 1, 2017).

The point of listing these cases is not to suggest that the Court has approved, in a considered manner, the practice of issuing injunctions that benefit non-parties as well as plaintiffs. The Court has never addressed the question at length. Our purpose is simply to demonstrate that these injunctions are so ordinary, so unremarkable, that defendants normally do not even think to argue that there is anything wrong with them. When the government is found to be acting unlawfully, the district courts routinely enjoin the government from doing so, without limiting the injunction to benefit only the plaintiffs.

D. The courts of appeals have unanimously held that injunctions may benefit non-parties.

Every court of appeals in which the question has arisen has concluded that federal courts have the authority to issue an injunction that benefits non-parties.

In two opinions by Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff need not file a class action to obtain relief for similarly-situated people in suits alleging unconstitutional government action, because an injunction could prohibit the government from acting unconstitutionally with respect to people other than the plaintiff. In *Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 490 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit affirmed an injunction barring the New York City Fire Department from using a dis-

criminatory employment examination. The district judge "was entirely right in thinking it unnecessary, from the plaintiffs' standpoint, for him to decide on class action designation in order to pass upon the issues raised," the Second Circuit explained, because "[i]f the examination procedures were found unconstitutional as regards the named plaintiffs, they were equally so as regards all eligible blacks and Hispanics." *Id.* at 399. Judge Friendly returned to the issue in a second case later the same year. "[I]nsofar as the relief sought is prohibitory, an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials on the ground of unconstitutionality of a statute or administrative practice is the archetype of one where class action designation is largely a formality," he wrote for the court. "[W]hat is important in such a case ... is that the *judgment* run to the benefit not only of the named plaintiffs but of all others similarly situated." *Galvan v. Levine*, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973).

The Fourth Circuit similarly affirmed a "nationwide" injunction prohibiting the federal government from unconstitutionally using a summary process to evict tenants from public housing, in a suit brought by tenants and tenant organizations in Richmond and Baltimore. *Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp*, 956 F.2d 1300, 1302 (4th Cir. 1992). The government challenged "the nationwide scope of the permanent injunction issued by the district court," *id.* at 1308, but the Fourth Circuit rejected the government's challenge on the ground that the benefit of an injunction need not be limited only to the plaintiffs before the court. "[A] federal district court has wide discretion to fashion appropriate injunctive re-

lief," the Fourth Circuit held. "When required by the circumstances of the case, district courts have issued injunctions which apply to conduct by the Attorney General of litigation in other federal courts." *Id. See also Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC*, 263 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that "[n]ationwide injunctions are appropriate if necessary to afford relief to the prevailing party"); *Evans v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ.*, 684 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1982) ("An injunction warranted by a finding of unlawful discrimination is not prohibited merely because it confers benefits upon individuals who were not plaintiffs or members of a formally certified class.").

The Fifth Circuit takes the same view. In *Texas v. United States*, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015), *aff'd by an equally divided Court*, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), the Fifth Circuit affirmed an injunction prohibiting the federal government from implementing the DAPA immigration program anywhere in the country, not merely in the states that filed suit. The federal government argued "that the nationwide scope of the injunction is an abuse of discretion and request[ed] that it be confined to Texas or the plaintiff states." *Id.* at 187. But the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's argument. "Congress has instructed that the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and *uniformly*," the Fifth Circuit pointed out, "and the Supreme Court has described immigration policy as a comprehensive and *unified* system." *Id.* at 187-88 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit concluded: "Partial implementation of DAPA would detract from the integrated scheme of regulation

created by Congress, and there is a substantial likelihood that a geographically-limited injunction would be ineffective because DAPA beneficiaries would be free to move among states." *Id.* at 188 (footnotes, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit held: "It is not beyond the power of a court, in appropriate circumstances, to issue a nationwide injunction." *Id. See also Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co.*, 661 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Injunctive relief which benefits non-parties may sometimes be proper even where the suit is not brought as a Rule 23 class action.").

A good indication of the novelty of the government's current argument can be found in the fact that in *Texas v. United States*, the government did not even argue that district courts lack the authority to issue injunctions that benefit non-parties. In the Fifth Circuit, the government merely argued that such an injunction was unwarranted on the facts of the case. In this Court, the government did not challenge the scope of the injunction at all.

The Sixth Circuit has also approved of injunctions that benefit non-parties as well as the plaintiff. In *Washington v. Reno*, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994), the government challenged as overly broad an injunction barring the use of certain funds for prison expenditures throughout the federal prison system. When the injunction was granted, the plaintiffs were not a nationwide class, but were individual inmates incarcerated in a single prison. *Id.* The Sixth Circuit nevertheless held that "it cannot be successfully argued that a nationwide injunction was improper." *Id.* The court explained: "Because relief for the named plaintiffs in the case would also necessarily extend to

all federal inmates, the district court did not err in granting wide-ranging injunctive relief prior to certifying a nationwide class of plaintiffs." *Id.* at 1104.

The Seventh Circuit likewise affirmed an injunction benefitting non-parties, in a suit filed by three individual residents of Milwaukee. *Decker v. O'Donnell*, 661 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit rejected the government's contention that "the district court erred in entering a nationwide injunction," on the ground that the plaintiffs challenged "the facial constitutionality of the statute," not merely the statute's constitutionality as applied to them. *Id.* at 618. *See also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.*, 444 F.2d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir. 1971) ("affirming the district court's power to consider extending [injunctive] relief beyond the named plaintiff").

The Ninth Circuit has also approved of injunctions that benefit non-parties in appropriate cases. In *Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck*, 490 F. 3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds*, 555 U.S. 488 (2009), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court order prohibiting the Forest Service from enforcing regulations the court found contrary to statute. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Forest Service's contention that the injunction should be limited to the Eastern District of California, where the suit was filed. *Id.* In *Bresgal v. Brock*, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction barring the Department of Labor from enforcing a certain statute against forestry workers. The Labor Department argued that "the injunction can cover only the named plaintiffs," *id.* at 1169, but the court disagreed. The

court held: "There is no general requirement that an injunction affect only the parties in the suit." *Id.*

The Tenth Circuit itself enjoined the Federal Reserve Board from enforcing a regulation that exceeded its statutory authority, in a case that came to the court directly from the Board. *Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.*, 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), *aff'd*, 474 U.S. 361 (1986). The Tenth Circuit did not limit the injunction to the plaintiffs. Rather, the court simply "set aside" the offending regulation, and ordered the Board not to "attempt to enforce or implement" it against anyone. *Id.* at 1411.

Finally, the D.C. Circuit has also rejected the government's challenge to "the district court's issuance of a nationwide injunction." *National Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs.*, 145 F.3d 1399, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Observing that "the district courts enjoy broad discretion in awarding injunctive relief," *id.*, the D.C. Circuit held that "when a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed." *Id.* at 1409 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Eight of the circuits have thus considered whether district courts have the authority to issue injunctions that benefit non-parties as well as the plaintiffs, and every single one has held that they do. No circuit has agreed with the government's argument that injunctions may only benefit the plaintiffs.

E. Neither constitutional nor equitable principles require the benefit of injunctions to be confined to plaintiffs.

The government suggests (U.S. Br. 72-73) that principles of standing and principles of equity prohibit district courts from enjoining the government's conduct with respect to anyone other than the plaintiff. The government errs in both respects.

1. A plaintiff obviously must have standing to obtain relief. *Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017). And remedies should of course be tailored "to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established." *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996). But when both of these requirements are satisfied, there is no constitutional impediment to an injunction from which non-parties may also benefit.

In a school desegregation case, for example, the plaintiffs are often individual schoolchildren who desire to attend integrated schools. They have standing, because they are injured by the existing system of segregation. An injunction ordering the schools to integrate would be appropriately tailored to redress this injury. Such an injunction would also provide the identical benefit to thousands of other schoolchildren who are not plaintiffs. They too would now be able to attend integrated schools. The law of standing does not require a court to exclude these other schoolchildren from receiving the benefit of the injunction.

Likewise, suppose the President were to issue an executive order purporting to bar left-handed people from voting. A left-handed citizen would clearly have

standing to challenge the executive order. An injunction setting aside the executive order would be appropriately tailored to redress the injury. Such an injunction would also provide the identical benefit to millions of left-handed citizens who are not plaintiffs. There is nothing in the law of standing that makes this result unconstitutional.

2. The government is equally mistaken in asserting (U.S. Br. 72-73) that equitable principles limit the benefits of injunctive relief to the plaintiff. This assertion rests entirely on the historical claim that in 18th-century England, an injunction could not provide benefits to non-parties. There is good reason to doubt the accuracy of this claim. Blackstone observed that in nuisance cases, a prevailing individual plaintiff was entitled "[t]o have the nu[i]sance abated," 3 William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* 221 (1768), in several factual settings where the plaintiff was clearly not the only person who would benefit, such as where a ditch has been "dug across a public way," *id.* at 220, or where a person "exercises any offensive trade" too close to an inhabited area, *id.* at 217. The government cites no evidence that in such cases equity required excluding non-parties from the benefits of an injunction—for instance, by allowing only the plaintiff to cross the ditch, or by enjoining only the noxious odors that reached the plaintiff.

In any event, the question in this case—whether a court may prohibit *the government* from exceeding its authority by issuing an injunction that benefits non-parties—could not have arisen in 18th-century England, for two reasons. First, England did not

have our concept of judicial review. Courts had no power to invalidate an Act of Parliament on the ground that Parliament had exceeded its authority. Philip Hamburger, *Law and Judicial Duty* 237 (2008). Second, because Chancery was understood as an emanation of the Crown, there could be no injunctions against the Crown or its servants. Bernard Schwartz, *Forms of Review Action in English Administrative Law*, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 214 (1956). English courts lacked the power to enjoin the other two branches of government from acting unlawfully.

Thus even if 250-year-old English practice is a reliable guide to the equitable remedies modern litigants may obtain against *private* parties, *see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.*, 527 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1999), English practice offers scant guidance when it comes to enjoining the government. When English monarchs exceeded their constitutional authority, they could be constrained only by military force, not by the courts. *See* Steve Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (2011). By contrast, much of our system of government was framed as an antidote to the English experience of the previous century. American courts can enjoin the government in ways that their English predecessors could not.

F. The APA presumes that courts may issue injunctions that benefit non-parties.

In the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress required the courts to "hold unlawful *and set aside* agency action" under various conditions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (emphasis added). Where a court finds that an agency has exceeded its authority, the court must

"set aside" the agency action. Not "set aside only with respect to the plaintiff." Just "set aside."

When a court sets aside an unlawful regulation, the plaintiff is often not the only beneficiary. The court orders the agency not to enforce the regulation, and everyone who would otherwise be subject to the regulation receives the same benefit. For instance, in *Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n*, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), the Court observed that if the Bureau of Land Management program at issue had been an "agency action," it could have been "challenged under the APA by a person adversely affected—and the entire 'land withdrawal review program,' insofar as the content of that particular action is concerned, would thereby be affected." *Id.* at 890 n.2.

Justice Blackmun discussed this point further in his dissenting opinion, in a passage with which the Court's majority did not disagree.

> In some cases the "agency action" will consist of a rule of broad applicability; and if the plaintiff prevails, the result is that the rule is invalidated, not simply that the court forbids its application to a particular individual. Under these circumstances a single plaintiff, so long as he is injured by the rule, may obtain "programmatic" relief that affects the rights of parties not before the court.

Id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Congress thus presumed in the APA that courts could grant injunctive relief that conferred benefits on non-parties as well as on the plaintiffs. Under "[t]raditional administrative law principles," when courts set aside unlawful agency actions in suits

brought under the APA, "the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed." *Harmon v. Thornburgh*, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989). *See also Earth Island Inst.*, 490 F.3d at 699 (noting that where a court sets aside an unlawful regulation, a "nationwide injunction" is "compelled by the text of the Administrative Procedure Act").

G. Some of the government's arguments against these injunctions bear on their appropriateness in any particular case, not on the court's authority to issue them.

A district court has the authority to grant an injunction that benefits non-parties as well as the plaintiff, but that does not mean such an injunction is always appropriate. In any particular case there may be good arguments for granting an injunction that only benefits the plaintiff. The government lists (U.S. Br. 75-76) some of them in its brief. Contrary to the government's view, however, these arguments bear only on the appropriate scope of an injunction in any particular case, not on the court's authority to issue an injunction that benefits non-parties.

The district court has broad discretion in fashioning injunctive relief. *United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.*, 532 U.S. 483, 496 (2001). In exercising this discretion, the court may find good reasons for limiting the benefit of the injunction to the plaintiff. For instance, if there are similar suits filed by other plaintiffs against the same defendant in other districts, the court might find it prudent to refrain from enjoining the defendant with respect to

those other plaintiffs. *See Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) ("It often will be preferable to ... gain the benefit of adjudication by different courts."). In any given case, there may well be considerations counseling in favor of a limited injunction that allows the defendant to continue its unlawful conduct with respect to people other than the plaintiff.

On the other hand, in any given case there may also be sound prudential reasons for enjoining the defendant from acting unlawfully, full stop. The scope of an appropriate remedy depends on the scope of the defendant's violation. *Missouri v. Jenkins*, 515 U.S. 70, 88-89 (1995). Where the defendant's violation harms a great number of people in addition to the plaintiff, there will be cases in which the most sensible way to secure relief for the plaintiff will be an injunction targeted broadly at the scope of the defendant's violation rather than narrowly at the scope of the plaintiff's own personal harm. For example, in *Texas v. United States*, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a nationwide injunction barring the government from enforcing the DAPA immigration program, even in states that were not plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit found that "a geographically-limited injunction would be ineffective because DAPA beneficiaries would be free to move among states." 809 F.3d at 188.

Likewise, in any given case, a court may find it prudent to avoid granting an injunction that allows the defendant to act unlawfully with respect to some people but not others. Immigration—for which the Constitution requires a "uniform Rule," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4—is a field in which uniformity may

be particularly desirable, because non-citizens can choose where to reside.

Moreover, in considering the proper scope of an injunction the court might take into account the wastefulness of requiring every person affected to file his or her own separate suit. For example, if the President were to take a patently unconstitutional action, one that no reasonable jurist could find lawful, a court might find that there is an interest in avoiding enormous amounts of duplicative and pointless litigation.

Such considerations, on both sides, should inform the court's discretion to choose the appropriate scope of an injunction in any particular case. But the key point is that these considerations have no bearing on the court's *authority* to grant an injunction that benefits non-parties in addition to the plaintiff. Rather, they are matters the court should consider in exercising that authority.

H. These injunctions are especially important where federalism is at stake.

When the federal government oversteps its constitutional bounds, it is often at the expense of local governments. But most local governments are very small. They lack the budgets and the legal staffs to litigate against the United States. In principle, we have a federalist system that protects local governments against encroachment, but federalism does not enforce itself. In practice, when federalism is at stake, there are often no private parties with standing to challenge the federal government, and there are only a handful of big cities that have the resources to file suit. When the federal government un-

lawfully harms local governments, therefore, most local governments have to rely on one of the big cities to get the injunction that forces the federal government to stop.

There are more than 90,000 local governments in the United States. U.S. Census Bureau, *Government Organization Summary Report: 2012* at 1.[2] Most are tiny. Eighty-five percent of municipalities have fewer than 10,000 residents. U.S. Census Bureau, *2012 Census of Governments* table 7.[3]

When the federal government unlawfully invades the province of local government, most of these local governments are powerless to resist. They need the big cities to shoulder the burden of litigation.

A good example took place very recently. Five days after his inauguration, President Trump issued an executive order purporting to condition local governments' receipt of already-appropriated federal funds on local governments' enforcement of federal immigration law. This executive order threatened to blow an enormous hole in the budgets of many local governments. The executive order was clearly unlawful: It attached conditions to federal spending that Congress had not authorized, and it commandeered local officials to carry out federal immigration policies. Two large local governments—San Francisco and Santa Clara County—promptly sought an injunction barring the federal government from enforcing the executive order. The district court granted an injunction that prohibited the federal government

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[2] https://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf.

[3] https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2012/econ/gus/2012-governments.html, table 7.

from enforcing the executive order, not just against the plaintiffs but against all local governments. *County of Santa Clara v. Trump*, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

If an injunction could benefit no one but the plaintiff, each local government affected by the executive order would have had to file its own suit and obtain its own separate injunction. Most of them could not have afforded to do so. Most local governments would have had only two choices: lose their federal funding or obey an unlawful executive order.

This example happens to involve the current administration, but our experience has been that prior administrations were just as likely to transgress the bounds of federalism. Local governments also brought federalism-based suits against the federal government under President Obama. *See, e.g.*, *Montgomery Cty. v. FCC*, 811 F.3d 121 (4th Cir. 2015); *City of Oakland v. Lynch*, 798 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2015); *City of Berkeley v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 2015 WL 1737523 (N.D. Cal. 2015); *City of Spokane v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n*, 775 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2014); *City of Arlington v. FCC*, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012). Not coincidentally, these suits were all filed by medium-to-large local governments.

This issue transcends politics. Federalism would be substantially under-enforced if the many thousands of small towns could not enjoy the benefits of injunctions obtained in suits filed by the handful of big cities with the resources to do so.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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